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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. 
ALAN KAY JUSTESEN, ; 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
) CASE NO. 20010315-CA 
) PRIORITY NO. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§§ 7 8-18a-
l(2)(a)(1999) and 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court properly rule that Justesen had been 
seized under the Fourth Amendment, where a law enforcement officer pulled up 
directly behind Justesen's vehicle late at night on an isolated stretch of highway, 
activated his take-down lights, and immediately asked for proof of Justesen's 
identification upon approaching the vehicle on foot? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The factual findings underlying a trial court's 
denial of a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah.Ct.App. 1996). The trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 22, 2000, Alan Kay Justesen was charged by information with 
one count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, one count of Driving on a 
Suspended License, and one count of False Information to a Peace Officer. Justesen 
moved to suppress all of the evidence which was obtained during his detention and 
arrest on the grounds that he was detained without reasonable suspicion, there was 
no reasonable suspicion to justify his initial based on Fourth Amendment violations 
which occurred during his initial detention. The trial court granted Justesen's 
motion to suppress, and on the State's motion, dismissed the criminal information 
without prejudice. The State filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 17,2001, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Sergeant Steganoff of the 
Carbon County Sheriffs Office was patrolling the airport road in Carbon County. 
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(Transcript of Suppression Hearing, hereafter "T" at 4:10-23). The Sergeant 
noticed a vehicle, which turned out to be Justesen's vehicle, parked on the right side 
of the road with no lights on. (T. 5:6-7). The place where Justesen's vehicle was 
parked was on an isolated, dark stretch of road. (T. 24:5-12). The Sergeant testified 
that he did not have any suspicion whatsoever of illegal activity related to Justesen 
or his vehicle. (T. 18:10-25,19:1-2). The Sergeant testified that he decided to 
approach Justesen's vehicle to see if the vehicle was broken down or abandoned, or 
if the occupants needed assistance. (T. 7:8-14). 
The sergeant pulled up behind Justesen's vehicle, and parked six to eight feet 
behind the vehicle. (T. 14:12-17). The officer had his headlights on when he pulled 
behind the vehicle, (T. 7:15-19), but took the additional step of activating his bright 
"take-down lights," which he described as two spotlights on the top of the police 
vehicle, before approaching Justesen's vehicle. (T. 7:24-25, 8:1-5). The Sergeant 
testified that he routinely uses the takedown lights when he effectuates a traffic stop 
at night. (T. 16:1-4). 
The Sergeant approached the driver's side of Justesen's vehicle on foot, and 
saw Justesen sitting in the driver's seat with his window rolled down. (R. 8:18-25, 
9:1-2). Upon approaching Justesen, the Sergeant did not ask whether he needed 
help, but instead asked him for some proof of his identity. (R. 9:8-9). The Sergeant 
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testified that he smelled alcohol as he spoke to Justesen (R. 9:16-20), and asked him 
to take a field sobriety test. (R. 10:1-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled that Justesen was detained for Fourth 
Amendment purposes where the Sergeant pulled up behind Justesen's vehicle on a 
dark, isolated stretch of road, immediately activated his take-down lights, and then 
asked Justesen for his identification immediately upon approaching the vehicle. 
Because no reasonable person under those circumstances would have felt free to 
disregard the officer and drive away, Justesen was detained for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Granted Justesen's Motion to Suppress 
Where the Officer Detained Justesen Without Reasonable Suspicion. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
See e.g. United States v. Stone. 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989). Under Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), a law enforcement 
officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes "if the officer 
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has a reasonable suspicion . . . that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). However, "[a]n 
officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions [without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause] as long as the citizen is not detained against his will. 
State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah.Ct.App. 1989¥quoting State v. Deitman. 
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)). In the instant case, the officer admitted that he 
did not have any suspicion of criminal activity when he approached Justesen, so the 
critical question is simply whether the initial stop was consensual, as asserted by the 
State, or rather, a detention for Fourth Amendment purposes, as asserted by 
Justesen. 
A police-citizen encounter is not consensual if, "in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he 
was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
In the instant case, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person could not have possibly felt free to simply disregard the officer's presence 
and drive away. First, the encounter between Justesen and the sergeant took 
place very late at night in a very isolated location. Secondly, the officer parked 
behind Justesen's vehicle and activated his "take down" lights before exiting his 
patrol car. Finally, the sergeant approached the window on the passenger side where 
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Justesen was sitting, and instead of asking whether Justesen needed any help, asked 
for proof of his identity. It is hard to imagine that a reasonable person in Justesen's 
position would have felt free to ignore the officer's presence and his questions and 
simply drive away. 
In fact, the circumstances in this case are similar to those in State v. Struhs. 
940 P.2d 1225 (Utah.Ct.App. 1997), wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
the stop was not consensual, and was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. In 
Struhs. a sheriffs deputy saw the defendant driving towards a construction site at 
about 10:00 p.m. Struhs at 1226. The defendant turned his truck around at the end 
of the road leading to the construction site, and backed up against some barricades 
and a sign that said "Road Closed." Id The deputy parked her vehicle directly in 
front of the defendant's car, nose to nose, but about one-and-a-half car lengths in 
front of the defendant's car. hi. The officer activated her headlights and her 
takedown lights, and approached the defendant's vehicle on foot. Id The Struhs 
court held that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave because of the 
late hour, the isolated location, the activation of the takedown lights, and the parking 
nose-to-nose with the defendant's vehicle. Id at 1228. Importantly, the court 
rejected the State's argument that the defendant was not detained for Fourth 
Amendment purposes simply because his car was not completely blocked in by the 
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police vehicle. Id 
In the instant case, as in Struhs. Justesen's car was admittedly not blocked in 
or physically obstructed by the police vehicle. But, as the Struhs court clearly 
recognized, merely because there is a rather obvious rule that a person is detained 
where the police physically obstruct the person's exit path, there is not a reciprocal 
rule that a person is not detained simply because the police do not physically 
obstruct the person's path. The critical question is simply whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to simply 
drive away, and the answer to that question, as argued above, is no. Furthermore, 
the State incorrectly characterizes the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress 
as "concluding that a detention occurred solely because the sergeant illuminated the 
dark roadside around the [vehicle]." The trial court based its ruling not only on the 
fact that the "extremely bright" take-down lights were activated, but on the time of 
night and the isolated location. (R. 13-14). The trial court also based its holding in 
part on the fact that the Sergeant asked Justesen for his identification upon 
approaching the driver's window. (R. 14)(officer seized the defendant "by 
activating his take-down lights and engaging in conversation with the defendant at 
the van's window"). Consideration of this factor is consistent with the Struhs 
decision, which referred to "the confrontational approach made by the officer" as 
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one factor which rendered the encounter a detention, instead of a consensual 
encounter. The only thing constituting a confrontational approach in Struhs was the 
fact that the deputy pulled up to the defendant with no lights on, and then suddenly 
activated her high beams and takedown light. Struhs at 1228. Similarly, in the 
instant case, the Sergeant's request for identification was confrontational in the 
sense that it invalidated any possible impression, as well as the sergeant's 
assertions, that the sergeant simply wanted to offer his assistance to the car's 
occupants. Thus, the trial court's decision was properly grounded in the totality of 
the circumstances, and not on the mere fact that the officer activated his take-down 
lights. 
Finally, the State grounds its arguments, and cites numerous cases, on the 
need for safety measures when officers effectuate traffic stops. While officer safety 
is undoubtedly a compelling interest, the State's assertions in this regard are 
misleading for two reasons. First of all, the State argues that the encounter in the 
instant case was a consensual encounter, and not a stop based on reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. With that in mind, it is one thing to argue that safety 
measures are required for confrontations between officers and citizens who are 
suspected of crimes - and another thing entirely to presume that officers are 
endangered by everyday consensual encounters with law-abiding citizens. Surely 
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our free and democratic society has not degraded to a point where police officers 
see every citizen as a danger to their lives, and vice versa. If that were so, we might 
have to rethink the idea that there could ever be a "consensual" encounter between a 
police officer and a citizen. Secondly, but on the same note, the trial court's holding 
will not prevent officers from using reasonable safety precautions such as spotlights 
in police-citizen encounters - whenever and wherever the officers have reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 
In sum, the trial court properly concluded, based in the totality of the 
circumstances, that a reasonable person in Justesen's position would not have felt 
free to disregard the sergeant's presence, and ignore his request for identification, 
and simply drive away. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that Justesen was 
detained for Fourth Amendment purposes was correct, and should be affirmed by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Justesen respectfully asserts that the trial court 
properly granted his Motion to Suppress, and requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
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DATED this 2^: day of October, 2001. 
DAVID ALLRED 
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